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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
FRANK BAINE, 
Appellant, ) 
GEORGE BECKSTEAD, Sheriff, 
Respondent. 
' 
' ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 
9049 
On March 14, 1958, appellant was convicted on a cheek 
charge in the District Court of Salt Lake County and sen-
tenced to a term in the Utah State Prison, but placed on 
probation under the supervision of the Adult Parole and 
Probation Department during good behavior and commit-
ment stayed during such probation (R-1, 2nd paragraph 
and R-4, paragraph 1). 
One of the provisions of the probation agreement was 
that appellant report to the court in person every 3 months, 
which he did (R-9). 
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On March 11, 1959, the probation officer filed an affi-
davit with the court alleging that on or about the 6th day 
of :\{arch, 1959, the appellant committed the crime of ru;sault 
with a deadly weapon apon one Earlene Kennon, (Exhibit 
P-1), and thereupon the court issued an Order requiring 
appellant to appear on the 16th day of :March and show 
cause (Exhibit P-2). 
The hearing on said Order was continue1i to March 
25th, at which time said Order to Show cause and affidavit 
was dismissed by the Court (R-14). 
March 27th being the regular reporting date for ap-
pellant under the original sentence and probation agreement, 
the appellant reported to the Court at which time, without 
notice or an opportunity to be heard and without any 
charges being made against him in any form W'llat_qoever, 
the Court made and entered the following Order: 
"Stay of execution of sentence terminated and 
execution to issue in accordance with sentence here-
tofore imposed. Commitment to issue forthwith. 
VanCott, Jr., Judge." 
Pursuant to this Order appellant was remanded to the 
custody of respondent for commitment to the "Ctah State 
Prison whereupon appellant applied for a writ of HabeM 
Corpus, (R-1). The writ was issued, (R-3), and upon hear-
ing thereon the writ was dismissed (R-6). From the Order 
dismissing the writ, this appeal is prosecuted to this Court 
and as grounds for reversal assigns the following errors: 
1. Error of the Court in dismissing the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
To sustain this appeal appellant relies on the following: 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIB-
ERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
PROBATION MAY NOT BE REVOKED WITH-
OUT ~OTICE AKD AN OPPORTCNITY TO BE 
HEARD. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
NO PERSO~ SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIB-
ERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Art. I, Sec. 7, Utah Colli'ltitution, 
14th Amendment, U. S. Constitution, 
State vs. Bonza, 150 P. 2nd 970. 
As applied to the revocation of probation this Court 
defined due process with the fo11owing language in State 
vs. Bonza.., supra, at page 972 Pacific citation: 
"A defendant out of prison on probation is ac-
corded due process of law by the following steps; 
(1) The filing of a verified statement or affidavit 
in the case setting forth the facts which show a vio-
lation of the terms of probation. (2) The issuance 
of an Order to Show Cause, etc. (3) A hearing be-
fore the court on the question of violation of some 
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term or condition of probation and an opportunity 
to crossexamine witnesses. (4) A determination of 
the question (by the court) followed by the entry 
of an appropriate order." 
The record now before this Court reveals that not one 
of the stepg above Huggested was even attempted to be com-
plied with by the court. Not even the last requirement 
which requires that the court make a finding that the terms 
or conditions of the probation agreement had been violakd. 
Further argument on this point would be a reflection on the 
intelligence of this Court. 
POINT II. 
PROBATION :MAY NOT BE REVOKED WITH-
OUT NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE 
HEARD. 
Ex Parte Pollett, 225 P. 2nd 16, 
SWte VS. Hemler, 102 So. 316, 
State vs. Zolant-akis, 259 P. 1044, 
Demmiek vs. Harris, 155 P. 2nd 170, 
State VS. Bcmza, 150 P. 2nd 970, 
Chestnut vs. Turner, Case ::-Jo. 120353, Dist. Ct. 
Salt Lake County. 
The question presented by this appeal is not new to 
this Court. It has been before this Court on many occasions 
and all of the cases cited herein are Utah cases except the 
Hemler case. 
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The Hemler case is an early Louisiana case wherein the 
defendant had been convicted of being an habitual violator 
of the liquor laws of the state, sentenced to the state prison 
but placed on probation during good behavior. Subsequent 
thereto, the defendant was again arrested for a liquor law 
violation and charged there·with in a court of competent 
jurisdiction and while said action was pending the proba-
tion court revoked his probation and committed defendant 
to the State Prison and on appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana said; 
"The act of the judge in arresting the defendant 
and committing him was premature and unauthor-
ized." 
and reversed the commitment. 
In the Zolantakis case this Court reviewed the author-
ities on this subject, including the Herntn· decision, after 
which it reached this concluflion; 
"The purpose of the law permitting the suspen-
sion of sentence is clearly reformatory. If those who 
are to be reformed cannot implicitly rely upon prom-
ises or orders contained in the suspension of sen-
tence, then we may well expect the law to fail in its 
purpose. Reformation cel"tainly can bel!t be accom-
plished by fair, consistant, and straightforward 
treatment of the person sought to be reformed. It 
would therefore seem, both upon authority and prin-
cipal, that when a sentence is suspended during good 
behavior, without reservations, the person whose 
sentence is thus suspended has a vested right to rely 
thereon so long as such condition is complied with. 
The right to personal liberty is one of the most sac-
red and valuable rights of a citizen, and should not 
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be regarded lightly. The right to personal liberty 
may he as valuable to one convicted of crime as to 
one not so convicted, and so long as one complies 
with the conditions upon which the right is assured 
by judicial declaration, he may not be deprived of 
the same. Such right may not be alternatively 
granted and denied without just cause." 
This decision has been before this Court for review in 
all of the other cases cited herein and many more and has 
been criticized, even by members of this Court, and the last 
expression on the soundness of this decision is found in the 
Pollett case wherein it is said: 
"If we are correct in our conclusion that a de-
fendant has a ve.sted right to his liberty during good 
behavior when so ordered without reservation in 
the original sentence, any proceeding failing in these 
essentials is error." 
After analyzing the problems that may arise in cases 
of this type, the Court continued: 
"But the question of whether a judge suspend-
ing a sentence during good behavior retains un· 
bridled power to change his mind on more mature 
thought with or without evidence of any conduct 
which would warrant such change of mind, may 
well await a case where the facts of the Zolantakis 
case are repeated before determining whether we 
desire to entirely overrule it. 
"It is not to be presumed that a judge, having 
absolute discretion to grant or deny probation, will 
arbitrarily revoke a defendant's probation or refuse 
to grant a further stay of execution when he has 
abided by the terllll'l of his agreement with the court 
and probation department." 
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In State VS. Bonw, this Court made the following rul-
ing without criticism. 
"Where the commission of a subsequent offense 
is made the basis of an application for termination 
of probation, and a complaint or information has 
been lodged charging probationer with i'tf!. commis-
sion, action by the probation court may well abide 
the determination of his guilt or innocence in the 
court before which the prooecution is conducted." 
In most o.:: the cases to reach this Court the revocations 
have been upheld on distinguishable factual situations. In 
the Demmick case the court granted a stay for the purpose 
of allowing the defendant to make cortuin disclosures of 
other parties involved in crime. The defendant failed to 
make the disclosures and he was committed without a hear-
ing, which this Court upheld. In one case the defendant was 
placed on probation and required to report to the court on 
a day certain. The defendant failed to report and the court 
revoked the probation without a hearing and this Court 
held that the burden rested on the defendant to justify his 
failure to report. In the Ronza case the defendant \Vas 
placed on probation and subsequently was convicted of 
petty offenses and on one occasion became involved in a 
felony in Tooele County for which he was not prosecuted, 
and upon notice and hearing his probation was revoked 
and upheld by this Court. We have already pointed out the 
distinguishing features of thi;; case, as pointed out by this 
Court. 
In the case at bar it is admitted that the appellant was 
placed on probation during good behavior, (R-1 and 4). An 
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affidavit was filed with the court alleging that defendant 
had committed a felony by assaulting Earlene Kennon with 
a deadly weapon. As het·etofore pointed out, it was made 
to appear that there was an action then pending wherein 
the appellant was formally charged with said offense, which 
action is now still pending, and thereupon the affidavit and 
Order to Shew Cause was dismissed. 
Afterwards on appellant's regular reporting day, with-
out notice and without any complaint of any kind or nature 
whatsoever being made against appellant, and without any 
finding of any cause whatsoever, the court summarily re-
voked probation and ordered appellant committed, and thus 
the question posed in the Pollett case is now forthrightly 
before this Court for determination, namely: 
"But the question of whether a judge suspend-
ing a sentence during good behavior retains un-
bridled power to change his mind on more mature 
thought with or without evidence of any conduct 
which would warrant such change of mind, may 
well await a case where the facts of the Zola.ntaki!J 
case are repeated before determining whether we 
desire to entirely overrule it." 
The Order to Show Cause and Affidavit having been 
dismissed, there was nothing before the court upon which 
the court could act, except upon his own volition and with-
out cause. 
Appellant contends that such action is inconsistent 
with our American concept of il1dividual liberty and free-
dom al< guaranteed by both State and Federal Constitutions. 
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For illu,;trative purposes let's assume that Earlene 
Kennon had appellant hemmed in a corner with a meat 
knife at his throat threatening to cut his head off and ap-
pellant had no other apparent means of escape, and there-
fore, struck her in the face with his fist, knocking her down 
and then jumped over her prostrate body and fled. Upon 
regaining consciousness Earlene called police and lodged 
this complaint against appellant. Can it be said that be-
cause appellant was on probation he had no right to defend 
himself with reasonable force? The answer is obviously 
no. Had appellant been given a chance to be heard he may 
have been able to completely refute the charge~\ made against 
him, and it is the position of appellant that the proper place 
for such defense is in the court ·where the charge is pend-
ing. See cases herein above cited. 
Chestnut vs. Turner is a case decided by the same court, 
but by a different judge, on April 23, 1959, wherein it was 
determined that Chestnut was held in the state prison by 
Turner, as warden, pursuant to a commitment from the 
Seventh District. The evidence shows that Chestnut had 
been convicted of burglary in the Seventh District and 
placed on probation. Subsequent thereto the Distrkt At-
torney reported to the Court that Chestnut had committed 
another crime by the theft of an automobile and the court 
revoked the probation and committed Chestnut without a 
hearing. Judge Larson granted the writ and ordered Chest-
nut discharged. Thus we have the same court making op-
posite rulings on the same question, which is a very un-
healthy atmosphere to impose upon society as a whole. If 
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such condition is allowed to exist in Salt Lake County, then 
the citizens thereof will be subject to rule by man rather 
than rule by law. 
CONCLUSION 
We have shown herein wherein appellant was deprived 
of his liberty without due process of law ag defined by this 
court and in violation of both state and federal constitu-
tions. In this we humbly submit that this Court should deny 
trial judges the unbridled power to toy with the Jives of men 
like a kitten playing with a mouse and reverse the Order 
dismis,·,ing the Writ, with costs to appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. H. OLIVER, 
Attorney for AppeUant. 
524 Beason Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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